A Chinese yuan devaluation could affect the stability of the Hong Kong dollar. This paper studies two linkages. The first, trade balance effect is studied through a CGE model. The result shows that the net change in Hong Kong's foreign reserve after a yuan devaluation is in fact negligible. The second, psychological effect is studied by a survey of financial market participants. In spite of the small trade balance effect, all respondents believe that a yuan devaluation would lead to a panic selling of Hong Kong assets. Therefore, a yuan devaluation is bad for Hong Kong dollar primarily through market psychology.
INTRODUCTION
Against the background of domino devaluations of most Asian currencies around China, the relative stability of the Chinese yuan, and the repeated pledges made by the Chinese leaders not to devalue the yuan, have attracted attention. On several occasions, U.S. treasury officials and International Monetary Fund officials have openly praised the Chinese decision to hold the yuan steady.
Is this a rational policy? Most will say that it is a good policy for the Asia region and for the world community. But is it a sensible policy for China's self interest, leaving aside possible soft "credits" it may get from foreign governments and international organizations? The answer to this question will help us to understand how committed the Chinese government is to the nondevaluation, and how long they will keep the commitment.
effect.
However, there are negative direct trade effects that directly act against the positive entrepot effect. An RMB devaluation would also reduce Hong Kong's direct exports to China (and possibly to elsewhere), and increases its imports from China. So the net effect of an RMB devaluation on Hong Kong's trade balance and hence its foreign reserve position is not clear without careful quantification. We will call this ambiguous net effect the trade factor. Surprisingly, we are not aware of any quantitative study that addresses this factor. This paper examines the trade factor and the psychological factor on the Hong Kong dollar if the RMB were devalued. The trade factor is quantified by using a CGE model to calculate the effect of an RMB devaluation on Hong Kong's external trade and on Hong Kong's ability to defend its currency. The psychological factor is assessed by using a small survey of currency and equity traders in Hong Kong on their reactions to a possible RMB devaluation.
The paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 provides a description of the CGE model used in this study. Section 3 presents the simulation results and related discussions. Section 4 discusses the small survey of traders. Section 5 concludes.
STRUCTURE OF THE CGE MODEL
The model used in this study is a multi sectoral, multi-country, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and is part of a family of models that have been used widely to analyze the impact of global trade liberalization and structural adjustment programs (Wang, 1997a) . It focuses on real trade flows, trade balances, world prices, and real exchange rates. Like most CGE models, it does not consider financial markets, interest rates, or inflation; and so cannot be used to analyze the direct impact of the crisis on financial markets. 5 Detailed algebraic specification of the model can be found in Wang (1997a) and Noland et al (1998) . Here we provide an intuitive description of its structure. The model includes 18 regions, 3 each with 14 sectors 4 and five primary factors of production: agricultural land, natural resources, capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor. 5 The regions are linked by commodity trade. Within each region, the model solves for domestic commodity and factor prices that equate supply and demand in all goods and factor markets. The model also solves for world prices equating supply and demand for sectoral exports and imports across the world economy. In addition, for each region, the model specifies an equilibrium relationship between the balance of trade (in goods and non-factor services, or the current account balance) and the real exchange rate (which measures the average price of traded goods -exports and imports -relative to the average price of domestically produced goods sold on the domestic market). An exogenous change in a particular region's exchange rate will reverberate across the world economy, affecting the aggregate trade balances and/or real exchange rates of all 18 regions as they adjust their trade flows and structures of production to achieve a new equilibrium.
In each regional model, there is one competitive firm in each sector, which produces only one product. The production is characterized by two-level nesting of constant elasticity of Howe, 1975 ). An economy-wide consumer price index is specified as the price of savings. It represents the opportunity cost of giving up current consumption in exchange for future consumption (Wang and Kinsey, 1994 There is an international shipping industry in the model, and each region allocates a fraction of the output of its transportation and service sector to satisfy the demand for shipping which is generated by interregional trade. The global shipping industry has a unitary elasticity of substitution among supplier sources. This means that the margins associated with this activity are commodity/route specific. In equilibrium, the total value of international transportation services at the world price equals the sum of the export proportions of the service sector's output from each region.
The government in each region imposes import tariffs, export subsidies, and indirect taxes, in ad valorem terms. Tariff and tax (subsidy) rates vary by sector and by destination.
The model determines relative prices within each region and on world markets. Traded and non-traded goods are assumed to be distinct (and imperfect substitutes) by sector, so changes in relative world market prices are only partially transmitted to domestic markets. The model thus incorporates a realistic degree of insulation of domestic commodity markets from world markets, but the links are still important and provide the major mechanism by which the crisis is transmitted across regions. However, since the model cannot determine inflation, only relative prices change.
The United States is specified as the "reference" economy, with both its aggregate price level and exchange rate specified as fixed exogenously. That is, all relative world prices and trade balances are measured in terms of real U.S. dollars. In addition, the aggregate consumer price index is fixed exogenously in each region, which defines a "no inflation" benchmark.
The equilibrium exchange rate determined by the model for each region can be interpreted as the real effective exchange rate (REER) deflated by the ratio of the regional consumer price index and the U.S. consumer price index. It is important to emphasize that the exchange rate variable in the model is not a financial exchange rate, since the model has no assets or asset markets. It represents 8 the equilibrium real exchange rate that is consistent with a given trade balance.
For each region, the model includes three macro balances: savings-investment, balance of trade (in goods and non-factor services), and government expenditure-receipts (government deficit).
The three balances are not independent and the determination of these macro balances is the subject of traditional macroeconomic models. In terms of our real trade model, which does not include financial markets or variables typical of macro models, the determination of these macro aggregates is specified by exogenously determined rules. The macro adjustment mechanism constitutes the macro "closure" of the model.
Since this model is used to explore the impact of changes in real exchange rates on trade balances, we specify a macro closure that assumes any macro adjustment is spread in a neutral manner across aggregate consumption, investment, and government expenditure. Aggregate investment and government expenditure are simply specified as fixed shares of total absorption in each region (or aggregate regional expenditure, which equals gross domestic product-GDP-plus imports minus exports). Aggregate domestic savings and balance of trade (foreign savings) in each region is assumed to adjust endogenously to match aggregate investment, thus achieving savings-investment equilibrium even with endogenous changes in the government deficit and the balance of trade.
In the aggregate, as noted above, there is a functional relationship between the balance of trade (in goods and non-factor services, or the current account balance) in each region and the real exchange rate. If the real exchange rate depreciates, the price of traded goods increases relative to the price of domestically produced goods sold on the domestic market. Exports increase, imports decrease, and the trade balance will improve. Given our assumption that aggregate investment is determined as a share of aggregate absorption, changes in the trade balance, which directly affect foreign savings, are assumed to have only a partial effect on aggregate investment in the region.
Instead, they lead to an equilibrium adjustment in the domestic savings rate, which partially offsets the change in foreign savings.
In the base solution, the initial trade balance and exchange rate are assumed to be in equilibrium for each region -that is, the initial trade balance is assumed to be "sustainable" and consistent with the initial real exchange rate. In simulation experiments, we change the exchange rate for a particular region, which changes the equilibrium trade balance both in aggregate and bilaterally. In the multi-region model, there is a ripple effect, since, as noted in the previous discussion, a depreciation in one region's real exchange rate implies a relative appreciation for its trading partners, leading to changes in their equilibrium trade balances as well. The world model is closed in the sense that the sum of all regional trade balances must be zero. Thus, we can use the model to see how real exchange rate shocks lead to adjustments in trade balances worldwide in a consistent framework.
In the simulations, we change the real exchange rate of one region at a time, keeping all other regional real exchange rates fixed (for a detailed description on the justification of simulation designs, see Norland, et al.,1998) . We use the model as a simulation laboratory to isolate the exchange rate transmission effect. We do not attempt to model a mix of exchange rate and trade balance adjustments or to forecast what might actually happen. This real model, with no money or asset markets, simply cannot be used for such forecasting. The model does allow us to explore structural adjustment effects such as changes in sectoral production, exports, and imports. In principle, the model could be linked to a macro model that includes asset flows and could determine the set of real exchange rates resulting from some macro shock. Our model could then be used to determine the resulting real trade flows and regional sectoral structural adjustments.
THE EFFECT OF A YUAN DEVALUATION ON HONG KONG'S TRADE BALANCE -THE TRADE FACTOR
The effects of any shock, an RMB devaluation included, on the Hong Kong dollar can be real (through its effect on Hong Kong's ability to defend its currency, particularly on the level of its foreign exchange reserve) or psychological (through its effect on market's perception on Hong Kong authority's commitment to defend the currency even if it were able to do so). Considering the changes in Hong Kong's foreign exchange reserve through changes in its trade account resulting from a RMB devaluation, or the real effect first, there are four channels need to analysis: a) Hong Kong's direct export to China declines, which reduces Hong Kong's foreign reserve.
b) Hong Kong's re-export (on behalf of the rest of the world) to China may decline.
Assuming that Hong Kong derives some value-added from this entrepot trade (this is debatable as will be made clear later), it has a negative effect on Hong Kong's foreign reserve.
c) Hong Kong's direct imports from China may increase, again reducing Hong Kong's foreign reserve.
d) Hong Kong's re-export for China (i.e., China's indirect exports to the rest of the world through Hong Kong) may increase. Assuming that Hong Kong gets certain percentage of value-added from this entrepot trade, its foreign reserve may increase.
The four channels have conflicting effects on Hong Kong's foreign reserve and hence its ability to defend the dollar peg (three negative and one positive). This is as far as non-numerical reasoning can go.
We now turn to simulation results from the CGE model. As a benchmark case, let us consider a 10 percent devaluation in RBM (vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar). Column 3 of Table 1A shows that Hong Kong's re-exports to China fall by USD 3,549 million, of which electronics, light manufacturing and textiles fall by USD 540, 282, and 267 millions, respectively. As large as these numbers may be in comparison with Hong Kong's direct exports, the effect on Hong Kong's foreign reserve may be very limited. Hong Kong's re-export to China, by definition has to be imported from the rest of the world first. So the effect on Hong
Kong's reserve depends on the markup that Hong Kong charges on this trade. Feenstra et al. (1998) shows that a reasonable estimate of the markup on this trade is somewhere between zero to 0.6 percent, reflecting an extremely competitive situation in reexporting to China. It has been argued that many mainland companies have branches in Hong Kong that have as much knowhow about exporting to China as any Hong Kong firm. This contributes to an ever lower margin in this business. In any case, if we use the zero markup estimate, obviously, Hong Kong's reserve is unaffected by the massive reduction in the indirect export to China(Column 4a in Table 1A ). The maximum drop in the foreign reserves (when the 0.6 percent estimate is used)
is only $21.3 million (Column 4b), which is less than a tenth of a percent of Hong Kong's US$88 billion foreign reserves at the end of the third quarter in 1998.
After a 10 percent RMB devaluation, Hong Kong's direct imports from China would increase by $925.4 million. More than half of the change come from textile ($320.1 million), food and agriculture (141.9 million) and "other manufacturing durables" ($228.6 million). (Column 5 in Table   1A ). According to Feenstra et al. (1998) there are three estimates of the markup for this entrepot trade: 23 percent, 27 percent, and 33 percent. Feenstra et al. (1998) preferred estimate is 27 percent.
In Columns 7a-7c of Table 1A , we report the changes in the value-added corresponding to each estimate of the markup.
The net effect of a 10 percent RMB devaluation depends on the relative size of the above four effects (Columns 2, plus 4, plus 7 and minus 5). Because there are two markup estimates for Hong Kong's re-exports to China (from the rest of the world), and three markup estimates for Hong
Kong's re-exports for China (or China's indirect exports), there are altogether six combinations of the estimates. which was lower by US$ 600 million from the end of March figure. The press release states that "the fall in foreign currency assets held in the Exchange Fund can be attributed to withdraws of fiscal reserves to meet government operational needs," and that "monthly figures of the foreign currency assets are likely to show short-term variations due to seasonal factors." So even the largest estimate of the effect of a 10 percent RMB devaluation on Hong Kong's official foreign exchange reserve is smaller than the actual month-to-month fluctuation in the reserve with an RMB devaluation.
To get a sense of the robustness of the estimates, Tables 2 and 3 report simulation results for a 5 percent and 20 percent devaluation of the Chinese RMB. We perform exactly the same set of calculations as in Table 1 . In both instances, Hong Kong would see a large increase in its foreign exchange earning through value-added derived from its re-exports for China to the rest of the world.
But this increase in the foreign exchange earning is not big enough to offset the decrease in earning through its widened trade deficit in its direct trade with China. After a 5 percent RMB devaluation, the net decline in Hong Kong's foreign currency assets will range from US$ 119 million to US$ 328 million. After a 20 percent RMB devaluation, the net decline in Hong Kong's foreign currency assets will be between US$ 327 million to US$ 1158 million. These are relatively small effects compared with the actual size of Hong Kong's trade deficit or the actual size of its official foreign assets or the month-to-month movement in the official foreign assets.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR
The previous section shows that a devaluation of the Chinese currency will have a small negative effect on Hong Kong's foreign exchange reserve through its effect on its trade account. As we stated earlier, the speculative pressure on Hong Kong dollar comes from the market perception of the Hong Kong authority's commitment to defend the currency as much as from the perception of the authority's ability to defend the currency. How would the market participants in Hong Kong react to a (hypothetical) news of RMB devaluation?
Towards this end, a survey of seven market participants was conducted. 8 The respondents include a currency trader, two securities traders, two portfolio (mutual fund) managers, and two investment bank economists. The survey was conducted between March 15-25, 1998 in Hong Kong.
The survey consists of three substantive questions in addition to the question asking the respondent to identify the line of business he or she is in. Because the survey is relatively short, we repeat the questions below. the RMB (versus U.S. dollar) exchange rate was about right, two thought it was overvalued between 10 percent and 20 percent, and three were not sure either way. In other words, there was no strong sentiment that the RMB is severely overvalued. This ambiguity in the answers is perhaps not surprising. From 1994 to mid-1997, the Chinese inflation rate had been a lot higher than the U.S.
rate. Yet, its currency, under a (tightly) managed float system, was actually appreciating in value at about 1 percent per year. Since mid-1997, its inflation rate has come down dramatically, to almost zero rate (in terms of CPI, or negative in terms of retail price inflation rate) in the first quarter of 1998.
On the second question, five out of seven people disagree with the hypothesis that an RMB devaluation will raise Hong Kong's foreign exchange reserve. But most did not check "strongly disagree." Two respondents actually checked "basically agree." This pattern of answers corresponds well to our discussion in the last section that the effect of an RMB devaluation has four effects on Hong Kong's trade account, in conflicting directions. While the net effect from the CGE simulations is negative, it is quantitatively small, which might explain why the survey respondents (without the tool of a CGE model) do not have a consensus on this.
The responses to question 3 stand out in sharp contrast to those to the early two questions.
All respondents agree with the hypothesis that an RMB devaluation will lead to a panic selling of the Hong Kong dollar. This suggests that the effect of an RMB devaluation on the Hong Kong dollar, in people's mind, must go beyond what it does to Hong Kong's trade account (or even foreign exchange reserves).
We should be careful about drawing too much from the survey given its small sample size.
The small sample prevents us from doing formal statistical testing. On the other hand, even in this small sample, it is remarkable that all respondents agree on the psychological effect of an RMB devaluation on the Hong Kong dollar (i.e., possible panic selling will be triggered).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
A devaluation of the Chinese Yuan will affect the defensibility of the peg of the Hong Kong dollar vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar through its impact on Hong Kong's trade balance, and its impact on the psychology of foreign exchange market participants. Hong Kong's trade balance is shaped to a significant extent by Hong Kong being the conduit of a huge amount of indirect trade between China and the rest of the world. It derives a significant income from the mark-up on its indirect exports for China but virtually no income from its indirect exports to China. This observation seems to suggest a devaluation of the Chinese currency could increase Hong Kong's foreign exchange earnings. Indeed, our CGE simulation shows that this effect is present. However, Hong Kong also loses foreign exchange earnings through its direct trade with China. The latter, negative effect, dominates the former, positive effect. On the other hand, the net effect is quantitatively small compared to Hong Kong's actual trade deficit or the actual size of its official foreign assets or the month-to-month fluctuations in the official foreign assets.
The psychological impact of a yuan devaluation is studied through a (small-sample) survey of financial market participants in Hong Kong in March 1998. The survey revealed several pieces of interesting information. The respondents were not sure whether the Chinese yuan was overvalued relative to the U.S. dollar. While most of the respondents thought that an RMB devaluation would not increase Hong Kong's foreign exchange reserves, everyone believed that an RMB devaluation would lead to a panic selling of the Hong Kong dollar.
The limited evidence that we have presented suggests that a yuan devaluation would tend to trigger a speculative attack on the Hong Kong dollar. Although our CGE model indicates that a yuan devaluation is likely to have a negligible effect on Hong Kong's overall trade balance because of four offsetting channels, the market psychology may work against the Hong Kong dollar. c. Using the share of China's export via Hong Kong in its total exports multiply changes of China's total exports (exclude China's direct export to Hong Kong) from the model. The share is calculated by authors using export data from the Chinese Customs and China's total exports (exclude Hong Kong's direct imports from China) at base year (1995) GTAP data.
FOOTNOTES
d. The markups margin is from Feenstra, Woo, and Yao (1998) . (1) The survey was conducted in Hong Kong between March 15-25, 1998. The full questions can be found in the text of the paper.
(2) "y" indicates a check.
